GR 154629; (October, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 154629 . October 5, 2005.
SPO4 MARINO SOBERANO, SPO3 MAURO TORRES and SPO3 JOSE ESCALANTE, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro Torres, and SPO3 Jose Escalante, along with numerous other police officers, were charged with the double murder of public relations practitioner Salvador “Bubby” Dacer and his driver, Emmanuel Corbito. The Information alleged they were abducted in Manila in November 2000, strangled, and their bodies incinerated in Cavite. Following a reinvestigation prompted by a co-accused’s sworn statement, the prosecution filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit an Amended Information. This amended pleading sought to discharge several accused, including P/Supt. Glen Dumlao, to become state witnesses, and to charge new individuals. The trial court granted the motion and admitted the Amended Information.
Petitioners opposed the amendment, arguing primarily that the discharge of accused Dumlao was improper. They contended that as a law enforcement officer, Dumlao was disqualified from being admitted into the government’s Witness Protection Program (WPP) under Republic Act No. 6981 , and therefore could not legally be discharged as an accused to become a state witness. The trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the discharge and the admission of the Amended Information, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the Amended Information which discharged P/Supt. Glen Dumlao as an accused to become a state witness, despite his alleged disqualification under the Witness Protection Program law.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, with modification. The Court clarified the distinct legal concepts of discharge of an accused to become a state witness under the Rules of Court and admission into the Witness Protection Program (WPP) under a special law. The discharge of an accused under Rule 119, Sections 17 and 18 of the Rules of Court is a procedural tool for the prosecution to utilize a co-accused’s testimony. The requirements are that there is absolute necessity for the testimony, the testimony can be corroborated, the accused does not appear to be the most guilty, and the accused has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The Court ruled that compliance with these Rule 119 requirements is the sole legal basis for a valid discharge. Admission into the WPP under R.A. No. 6981 is a separate administrative process that provides protection and benefits to a witness; it is not a prerequisite for a valid judicial discharge. Dumlao’s status as a law enforcement officer, while potentially affecting his eligibility for the WPP’s benefits, does not automatically disqualify him from being discharged as a state witness under the Rules of Court if he meets all the requisite conditions. The trial court’s determination that Dumlao satisfied the criteria for discharge was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.