G.R. No. 154098 . July 27, 2005.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, and FAUSTINO DY, JR., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose C. Miranda, then Mayor of Santiago City, was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman for six months. During this suspension, he reassumed his office, prompting the Vice Mayor to file a complaint for usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. Miranda claimed he acted in good faith, believing the suspension beyond 60 days was invalid under the Local Government Code, and that he complied after receiving a DILG memorandum directing him to vacate. The Ombudsman filed an Information for usurpation. After a reinvestigation, a Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal, but the Ombudsman overruled this and proceeded with the prosecution.
During the pendency of the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution moved to suspend Miranda pendente lite under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Act). Miranda opposed, arguing that Section 13 applies only to offenses under R.A. 3019, Title VII of the RPC, or those involving fraud upon government or public funds, which usurpation of authority is not. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered Miranda’s preventive suspension for 90 days, ruling that usurpation involves fraud upon the government.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 for the crime of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court upheld the suspension. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 , which mandates the suspension of an incumbent public officer against whom a valid information is pending for offenses under the Act, under Title VII, Book II of the RPC, or “for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property.” The Court ruled that the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions falls within the catch-all phrase “any offense involving fraud upon government.”
The Court defined “fraud” in its general sense as encompassing anything calculated to deceive, including acts involving a breach of legal duty resulting in damage or the taking of an undue advantage. By unlawfully reassuming the powers and functions of the Office of the Mayor while under a valid suspension order from the Ombudsman, Miranda committed an act of deception against the government. This act undermined the lawful order of a constitutional body, disrupted the proper administration of local government, and constituted a fraud upon the government by illegally exercising authority. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan correctly applied Section 13, as the charge involved fraud upon the government, warranting mandatory preventive suspension pending trial. The petition was dismissed.