GR 152864; (September, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 152864-65 September 27, 2006
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPO1 MARIO MARCIAL, SPO1 MONICO BOLOTANO, SPO1 ANASTACIO MAGLINTE, SPO1 ALFREDO NUÑEZ, SPO1 RUDY BUNALOS, and PO3 TOMAS DUHAYLUNSOD, respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, all police officers, were charged with homicide and frustrated homicide for a shooting incident on December 18, 1999, which resulted in the death of Junnyver Dagle and serious injury to Wendell Sales. During pre-trial, the parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts. The prosecution subsequently filed a motion for a reverse order of trial, arguing that since the accused had effectively admitted the killing and injury by claiming self-defense, the burden of proof should shift to them to prove their justifying circumstance.
The Regional Trial Court denied the motion. It ruled that the stipulation of facts did not constitute a clear admission of guilt by the accused, that a reverse order would delay proceedings, and that the trial should follow the usual sequence under the Rules of Court. The prosecution filed a petition for review, assailing this denial as a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in denying the prosecution’s motion for a reverse order of trial.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is grounded on the discretionary nature of modifying the order of trial. Under Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a modification is permissible only “when the accused admits the act or omission charged but interposes a lawful defense.” The Court found that the pre-trial stipulations did not constitute such a judicial admission of the criminal acts.
The stipulations merely established basic, neutral facts such as the identities of the parties, the police response, the presence of the victims on a motorcycle, that shots came from the respondents’ direction, and the resulting injuries. Crucially, they did not include an admission that the respondents’ gunfire caused the injuries. The respondents pleaded not guilty and the issues framed, including whether the victims fired first, remained contested. Therefore, the essential precondition for a reverse order—an admission of the act charged—was absent. The trial court’s exercise of discretion was proper. Furthermore, the denial of such a motion is interlocutory and not appealable, and the petition itself caused undue delay.