GR 152827; (February, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 152827 ; February 6, 2007
GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA and IYLENE all surnamed MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. SOLEDAD SALINAS, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Soledad Salinas successfully applied for original registration of a 20,149-square-meter parcel of land in Olongapo City. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a land registration court, granted her application, issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-10053 in her name, and subsequently granted her motion for a writ of possession. Petitioners Gerardo, Trinia, and Iylene Mendoza opposed the issuance of the writ, claiming they were not parties to the registration case and had been in actual physical possession of a portion of the property since 1964. They supported their claim with a Sales Application filed by Gerardo in 1986 and Declarations of Real Property from 1976 and 1985.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, arguing the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ. Respondent countered that the petition violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, as it should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, and that petitioners were bound by the general order of default issued in the land registration case.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition and, if so, whether the RTC correctly issued the writ of possession against the petitioners.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition. On the procedural issue, direct resort to the Supreme Court was proper. The petition was filed under Rule 45, raising purely questions of law concerning the correct application of legal principles for issuing a writ of possession. The principle of hierarchy of courts does not apply when only questions of law are involved, as an appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court from RTC judgments.
On the substantive issue, the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession. While a writ of possession is generally issuable as a consequence of a decree of registration in original land registration proceedings, it cannot be issued against persons in actual possession of the land under a claim of ownership who were not parties to the registration case. The petitioners’ actual possession since 1964, supported by documentary evidence, raised a disputable presumption of ownership. Against such possessors, the remedy for the registered owner is not a summary writ of possession but a separate judicial action for recovery of possession. The Court cited Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, which explicitly prohibits the summary ejectment of such possessors via a writ of possession in land registration proceedings. Therefore, the assailed order was nullified and set aside, without prejudice to respondent filing an appropriate action for recovery.