G.R. No. 152044 ; July 3, 2003
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin, petitioners, vs. The People of the Philippines and the Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin were convicted by the Regional Trial Court for violation of the Revised Forestry Code and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum term of eight years, which is non-probationable under Section 9(a) of the Probation Law (P.D. 968). They appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed their guilt but modified the penalty, reducing the maximum term to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days, which is within the probationable range. Following this modification, the petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court.
The trial court denied their application, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The denial was based on Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended by P.D. 1990, which states that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.” The petitioners argued that this rule should not apply because they only became eligible for probation after the appellate court reduced their sentence, and they could not have applied earlier when the trial court’s penalty was disqualifying.

ISSUE

Whether petitioners, who appealed their conviction and subsequently received a reduced, probationable sentence from the appellate court, are barred from applying for probation under Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the denial of probation. The legal logic is anchored on the clear, mandatory, and non-discretionary language of Section 4 of the Probation Law. The provision explicitly states that an application for probation shall not be granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal. The law makes no exception for appellants who later receive a reduced sentence that falls within probationable limits. By choosing to appeal, petitioners relinquished the alternative remedy of probation. The Court emphasized that the purpose of this rule is to prevent an accused from speculating—availing of an appeal while keeping probation as a fallback should the appeal fail. The Court noted that petitioners’ appeal did not solely assail the penalty but also impliedly asserted their innocence, which is inconsistent with the rehabilitative purpose of probation that presupposes an acceptance of the judgment of conviction. While the Court acknowledged the potential equity in allowing probation where an appeal is filed solely to correct a non-probationable penalty, it found no basis to apply such an exception here, given the petitioners’ broader challenge to their conviction. Thus, having perfected their appeal, they were irrevocably barred from probation.