G.R. No. 150274 , August 4, 2006
IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, Petitioner.

FACTS

Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, a District Engineer, was administratively charged and found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman, which ordered his dismissal from service. This decision was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner and co-accused subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144694 . While this appeal was pending, then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong issued a Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001, dismissing petitioner from the service effective immediately. The Secretary cited the Ombudsman’s and the Court of Appeals’ decisions, noting the absence of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court.
Petitioner filed the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court. He contends that the issuance of the dismissal order during the pendency of his appeal before the Supreme Court was a contumacious act that constituted unlawful interference with judicial proceedings, pre-empted the Court’s decision, and degraded the administration of justice.

ISSUE

Whether or not Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the dismissal Memorandum Order while petitioner’s appeal was pending before the Supreme Court.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no basis for contempt. The Court explained that the power of contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly, reserved for willful conduct intended to impede or obstruct justice. The issuance of the Memorandum Order did not constitute such contumacious conduct. Secretary Datumanong acted based on the immediately executory nature of decisions from the Civil Service Commission under specific laws, a principle he may have erroneously but not maliciously applied to this case originating from the Ombudsman. The Court clarified a critical distinction: decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are not immediately executory pending appeal, as held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals. Therefore, while the Secretary’s act was a legal error in judgment—mistaking the Ombudsman’s decision for one immediately enforceable like a Civil Service Commission ruling—it lacked the element of willful bad faith or deliberate intent to disrespect the court’s authority required for contempt. The act was, at most, a result of confusion over applicable execution rules and did not directly or indirectly degrade the administration of justice.