G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority vs. Kenrick Development Corporation

FACTS

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a complaint for annulment of title against Kenrick Development Corporation and Alfonso Concepcion. The Republic alleged that Kenrick’s titles, used to claim and fence land within Villamor Air Base, originated from a non-existent mother title. Kenrick filed an answer purportedly signed by its counsel, Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. During a Senate hearing, Atty. Garlitos testified that he only prepared a draft of the answer and transmitted it unsigned to Kenrick’s president; the signature on the filed answer was not his, and he did not authorize anyone to sign for him. Based on this, the Republic filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default for failure to file a valid answer.
The trial court granted the motion, striking the answer from the records as an unsigned pleading under Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, declaring Kenrick in default, and allowing ex parte presentation of evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed this order via certiorari. It found Atty. Garlitos’ legislative testimony unreliable for lack of cross-examination and held that his subsequent acts constituted ratification of the answer’s filing, curing any defect.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order declaring respondent in default for failure to file a valid answer?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order of default. The legal logic centers on the principle of adoptive admission and the mandatory nature of the rule on signature requirements. Atty. Garlitos’ clear and uncontroverted testimony that he did not sign the answer and did not authorize anyone to sign it was an adoptive admission binding upon Kenrick, which never denied or contradicted his statements. By building its defense on his testimony, Kenrick adopted his assertion that the pleading was unsigned by counsel.
Consequently, the answer was an unsigned pleading, which under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, produces no legal effect. It is considered a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the period to file a responsive pleading. The Court of Appeals erred in speculating about implied ratification; the rule on signature is mandatory to ensure counsel’s certification of good faith and knowledge. The defect was not a mere formal lapse but a substantive violation, warranting the declaration of default. The trial court correctly exercised its discretion in striking the invalid answer and proceeding with the ex parte reception of the Republic’s evidence.