G.R. No. 149472 ; October 15, 2002
Jorge Salazar, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Jorge Salazar, Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group Inc. and consultant of Aurora Manufacturing & Development Corporation, was charged with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that on or about January 10, 1986, in Makati, he received $41,300.00 from Skiva International, Inc. (through its agent Olivier Philippines) for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor to manufacture 700 dozen stretch twill jeans. With unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, he misappropriated and converted the amount for his personal use despite demands to return it.
Skiva, a New York-based corporation, imported clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier. Aurora and Uni-Group were domestic supplier corporations. Werner Lettmayr was President of both Aurora and Uni-Group. In December 1985, Skiva, needing ladies jeans, issued a Purchase Contract to Uni-Group (confirmed by Lettmayr) and a corresponding Sales Contract from Olivier to Skiva. On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed Skiva would advance $41,300.00 to Aurora/Uni-Group as they lacked funds for raw materials, with the amount being an advance payment for the jeans. Skiva issued a check, but due to clearance time, the parties arranged a telegraphic transfer instead. The funds were remitted from Skiva’s bank in New York to the joint Citibank account of Mr. & Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. & Mrs. Werner Lettmayr.
Petitioner, possessing the passbook, withdrew $21,675.21 on January 16, 1986, and $20,000.00 on January 22, 1986, with subsequent deductions for transfer fees. Teresita Tujan of Olivier followed up on production and learned only 3,000 meters of the required 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics were purchased, sufficient for only 200 dozen jeans. Lettmayr directed inquiries to petitioner, who could not be located. Demand was made on March 13, 1986, for Aurora/Uni-Group to return the money. After preliminary investigation, an information was filed only against petitioner. The trial court convicted him of estafa, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty and ordering restitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) are: (1) receipt of money, goods, or personal property in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery or return the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion of such property by the offender, or denial of receipt; (3) prejudice to another; and (4) demand by the offended party.
The contract between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was a contract of sale. Upon remittance of the advance payment, ownership of the money transferred to Aurora/Uni-Group, whose obligation was to deliver the jeans, not to account for the money to Skiva. However, petitioner, as an employee aware of the specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt and withdrawal of the funds, had the obligation to account for the proceeds to Aurora/Uni-Group. He received the money in trust with a duty to return or account for it.
Regarding misappropriation, petitioner claimed part of the money was used to purchase 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics and the balance given to Aurora. However, on cross-examination, he could not recall the amounts paid or given, nor whether payment was in cash or check. He presented no evidence to support his defense except his bare testimony. A letter from PHIVIDEC indicating an amount “due to Uni-Group” was deemed to have no probative value due to inconsistencies in testimony about its procurement and because the authenticating witness was no longer connected with PHIVIDEC. Furthermore, the prosecution established that after the withdrawals, only minimal amounts remained in the account, and the jeans were not delivered. Petitioner’s failure to account for the funds constituted conversion.
The Court also addressed petitioner’s argument that the complaint was filed by Skiva, which the lower court found had no right to demand accounting from him. It ruled that a complaint for preliminary investigation may be filed by any competent person, and a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information filed in court. The complaint filed with the fiscal was valid.
The petition was denied, and the appealed judgment was affirmed.