G.R. No. 149453 ; May 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON

FACTS

This case involves the “Kuratong Baleleng” multiple murder charges. Following the 1995 incident, the Ombudsman filed eleven Informations for Murder against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and others before the Sandiganbayan. After a reinvestigation, the charges against Lacson were downgraded from principal to accessory. This led to a jurisdictional challenge, as the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7975 required a principal accused with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Consequently, the cases were transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. However, the private complainants later filed an Affidavit of Desistance. Based on this, the Quezon City RTC, in an Order dated March 29, 1999, dismissed the criminal cases, finding the desistance to be voluntary and that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause.
Subsequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a reinvestigation upon a new complaint filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP). The DOJ found probable cause and filed new Informations for Murder against Lacson and others before a different branch of the Quezon City RTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112. Lacson filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals, assailing the reinvestigation and seeking the dismissal of the new cases, arguing they constituted a violation of his right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the new Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112) after the dismissal of the earlier cases (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689) violates the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

RULING

No, double jeopardy has not attached. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the dismissal of the first set of cases (Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689) was without the express consent of the accused, Lacson, which is a requisite for a valid claim of double jeopardy. The legal logic is anchored on Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states that dismissal upon the express application of the accused or with his consent is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Here, the dismissal was initiated by the trial court based on the private complainants’ desistance and its own assessment of the evidence, not upon motion or application by Lacson. His subsequent filing of motions to dismiss after the court had already ordered the dismissal did not constitute express consent to that initial dismissal order. Since the dismissal was without his express consent, it was not equivalent to an acquittal and therefore does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the requirements for a reinvestigation under the Rules were complied with before proceeding.