GR 149382; (March, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 149382-149383; March 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO BODOSO Y BOLOR, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Ricardo Bodoso was charged with two counts of qualified rape against his 14-year-old daughter. During trial, the prosecution presented the complainant and a medico-legal officer. After the prosecution rested, the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence. The records for that scheduled hearing date, however, contained no transcript of stenographic notes or minutes. The only available record was a cryptic trial court order stating that upon the manifestation of defense counsel, the defense was not intending to present any evidence and was resting its case. The trial court subsequently rendered a judgment convicting Bodoso of two counts of qualified rape and imposed the death penalty for each count, leading to an automatic review by the Supreme Court.
In his Appellant’s Brief, counsel de oficio from the Public Attorney’s Office challenged the factual findings of the trial court, arguing the charges were fabricated and the victim’s minority was not sufficiently proven. Notably, counsel did not raise any issue regarding the validity of the accused’s waiver of his right to present evidence as reflected in the trial court’s order.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed a reversible error in accepting the accused-appellant’s waiver of his right to present evidence without ensuring it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases involving capital offenses, the waiver of the constitutional right to present evidence and be heard must not be taken haphazardly. Such a waiver must be scrutinized under a strict procedure to ascertain it was done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of its consequences. The standard requires the waiver to be positively demonstrated; it cannot be presumed from a silent or ambiguous record.
In this case, the record was utterly deficient. There was no transcript or minutes from the hearing where the waiver was purportedly made. The trial court’s order was terse and provided no basis to determine if the accused himself was present, if he was properly consulted, or if he understood the severe implications of waiving his right to present a defense, especially given the death penalty at stake. The Court held that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct a proper “searching inquiry” into the validity of the waiver. Since the waiver was invalid, the accused was deprived of due process. The case was remanded to the trial court to properly ascertain the voluntariness of the waiver and, if found invalid, to receive the evidence for the defense.
