G.R. No. 149349 . March 11, 2005
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC. (now GLAXO SMITHKLINE), Petitioner, vs. NAGKAKAISANG EMPLEYADO NG WELLCOME-DFA (NEW-DFA), JOSSIE RODA DE GUZMAN, and NORMAN B. CEREZO, Respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a union election and subsequent disciplinary actions. Respondent union NEW-DFA filed a petition for certification election. The election resulted in a tie between “NO UNION” and NEW-DFA. The union filed an election protest, alleging company interference through pre-election incentives and parties, but the protest was dismissed for lack of substantial evidence. Separately, petitioner Glaxo implemented a new Car Allocation Policy based on sales performance, requiring the reassignment of vehicles from union officers Jossie Roda de Guzman and Norman Cerezo.
Both employees repeatedly refused to surrender their assigned company vehicles despite several written directives and a final warning. De Guzman was subsequently terminated for gross insubordination via a letter dated December 20, 1990. Cerezo was suspended for thirty days. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the dismissals valid. The Court of Appeals modified the decision, ordering Glaxo to pay de Guzman full backwages and Cerezo his salary for the suspension period, citing denial of due process.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of Jossie Roda de Guzman and the suspension of Norman Cerezo were effected in accordance with procedural due process.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal and suspension were for a just cause (gross insubordination) but were executed without procedural due process. The Court reiterated the twin-notice rule for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The employer must give a first notice specifying the grounds for termination and allowing the employee to answer. A second notice must then inform the employee of the decision to dismiss. The notices need not follow a specific form but must adequately inform the employee of the charges and provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Here, Glaxo’s letters to de Guzman were mere directives to return the vehicle, culminating in a final warning and then a single letter citing and terminating her simultaneously. This combined notice did not satisfy the two-notice requirement, as it did not afford her a genuine opportunity to explain her side before the decision to dismiss was made. Similarly, Cerezo’s suspension was imposed without the requisite hearing. Consequently, while the penalty was justified by the offense, the lack of procedural due process rendered the dismissal and suspension illegal. The Court affirmed the CA’s award of backwages to de Guzman (from dismissal until finality of judgment) and salary for the suspension period to Cerezo as indemnity for the procedural violation, in line with the doctrine established in Agabon v. NLRC.