G.R. No. 149148 . April 5, 2002.
SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ROXAS CITY, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, HONORABLE SALVADOR GUBATON, OFFICE OF THE CITY FISCAL, HONORABLE JULIUS ABELA, SANTIAGO B. VILLARUZ, respondents.

FACTS

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the Ombudsman’s resolution finding a prima facie case against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Roxas City, for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The case arose from Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433 involving the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz. Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was removed as administrator and replaced by his brother, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., subject to posting a bond. Santiago and another brother opposed, citing a certification and agreement granting Santiago a lease over nipa lands until 2008. Judge Roger B. Patricio’s September 22, 1998 order denied the opposition but recognized the validity of the lease in its text, though not in its dispositive portion. The case was reassigned to Judge Sergio Pestaño, who on October 12, 1998, approved Nicolas’s bond. Petitioner then prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) based on a form from the Manual for Clerks of Court, stating Nicolas was appointed administrator with “full authority to take possession of all property/ies.” Nicolas, with a sheriff, took possession of the entire estate, including the leased nipa lands. Santiago filed a complaint with the Ombudsman, alleging falsification for attributing statements not made by the judge and violation of R.A. No. 3019 for causing undue injury through manifest partiality, bad faith, or gross negligence. Petitioner countered that her duty was ministerial, following Judge Pestaño’s order and the prescribed form. The Ombudsman found probable cause, which petitioner sought to reconsider, arguing the orders’ dispositive portions did not mention the lease. The motion was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the Ombudsman’s resolution and order. The Court held that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion. On the charge of falsification under Article 171, the Court ruled that petitioner did not falsely attribute anything to Judge Pestaño. The LOA correctly stated that by Judge Pestaño’s order, Nicolas was appointed administrator. The statement that Nicolas had “full authority to take possession” was a standard recital from the prescribed form in the Manual for Clerks of Court, which she was duty-bound to follow. She did not fabricate the judge’s order. On the charge under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 , the Court found no evidence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Petitioner’s act of issuing the LOA was a ministerial duty performed in accordance with a court order and the prescribed form. A clerk of court’s duty to prepare and issue such letters is ministerial, not discretionary. She was not required to look beyond the dispositive portion of Judge Pestaño’s order, which simply approved the bond. The lease agreement, while mentioned in the text of Judge Patricio’s earlier order, was not incorporated into the dispositive portion of any order directing the issuance of the LOA. Therefore, petitioner committed no irregularity. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause was based on a misapprehension of facts and law, constituting grave abuse of discretion.