G.R. No. 149053 . March 7, 2007.
CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Planters Products, Inc. filed a collection case against petitioner Central Surety and Insurance Company and others. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision on November 6, 1991, holding petitioner liable. Petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees on December 7, 1992, and this dismissal became final on March 12, 1993, with entry of judgment on May 27, 1993. Respondent filed a motion for execution in the RTC on October 12, 1993, and a writ was issued. However, petitioner filed various motions and a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which caused delays and even led to a temporary restraining order against execution. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed petitioner’s petition on July 11, 1994.
On June 18, 1999, more than five years after the entry of judgment, respondent filed another motion for an alias writ of execution in the RTC. Petitioner opposed, arguing that under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, execution by mere motion is only allowed within five years from entry of judgment, and thereafter, a separate action is required. The RTC granted respondent’s motion, and the CA affirmed this order, dismissing petitioner’s certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion despite the lapse of five years from entry of judgment.

RULING

Yes, execution by mere motion is permissible even after five years under the circumstances of this case. Rule 39, Section 6 provides the general rule that a final judgment may be executed by motion within five years from entry. However, an established exception exists when the delay in execution is caused by the judgment debtor’s own actions. The Court, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Camacho v. Court of Appeals, held that the five-year period is effectively interrupted or suspended when the delay is occasioned by the initiatives of the party opposing execution, undertaken to gain an undue advantage.
Here, the delay beyond the five-year period was directly attributable to petitioner’s own dilatory maneuvers, including filing motions and appeals that resulted in a temporary restraining order and protracted the proceedings. Petitioner cannot now invoke the five-year rule to further delay its obligation. Respondent persistently sought execution and did not sleep on its rights. Applying the rule strictly would frustrate justice. Therefore, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s grant of the alias writ of execution by mere motion. The petition was denied.