GR 148641; (March, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 148641 . March 31, 2005
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMILY ROSE GO KO and KIDDY LIM CHAO, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner PCI Leasing for Annulment/Reformation of Chattel Mortgage and related reliefs with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The trial court, by Order dated February 16, 2000, granted respondents’ prayer for a preliminary injunction. Petitioner received the order on February 18, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000, which was denied by Order dated May 22, 2000. Petitioner received notice of this denial on June 2, 2000.
On July 31, 2000, fifty-nine days after receipt of the denial, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, applying Section 4, Rule 65 as amended by Circular No. 39-98, dismissed the petition for being filed beyond the reglementary period. It computed that petitioner had only 47 remaining days from June 2, 2000, making the deadline July 19, 2000; the July 31 filing was 12 days late. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being filed out of time, and whether the subsequent amendment to Rule 65 (A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC) should be applied retroactively to deem the petition timely filed.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1, 2000, is curative in nature and must be applied retroactively. This amendment reverted the rule such that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is counted from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration, without deducting the time spent filing such motion.
The Court, citing Narzoles v. NLRC, ruled that curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in prior law and validate proceedings that would otherwise be void due to technical irregularities. Their very essence demands retroactive application to give effect to acts that were invalid under the old rule. Since the case was not yet finally resolved when the curative amendment took effect, it applies to petitioner’s case. Therefore, petitioner’s filing period should be reckoned anew from June 2, 2000, making its July 31, 2000 petition timely, having been filed within 60 days. The appellate court’s dismissal based on the old, superseded computation was erroneous.