G.R. No. 148496 . March 19, 2002.
VIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and style TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Virgines Calvo, operating as Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a customs broker and sole proprietorship, contracted with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to transfer 238 reels of paper from the Port of Manila to SMC’s Ermita warehouse. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. The shipment, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived on July 14, 1990. From July 23 to 25, petitioner withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC.
Upon inspection on July 25, 1990, 18 reels were found to be wet, stained, or torn, with damages valued at P93,112.00. SMC claimed and was paid this amount by respondent UCPB under its insurance policy. Respondent, as subrogee, then filed a complaint against petitioner for damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondent, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner is a common carrier and thus liable for the damage to the cargo based on the presumption of fault under Article 1735 of the Civil Code.

RULING

Yes, petitioner is a common carrier and is liable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court rejected petitioner’s contention that she was a private carrier merely offering services to select clients like SMC. Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the definition of a common carrier under Article 1732 of the Civil Code is broad and includes those who hold themselves out as ready to transport goods for compensation for the general public, even if such services are offered on a limited clientele or a fixed route. Petitioner’s business of transporting goods for a fee falls within this ambit.
As a common carrier, petitioner is bound to observe extraordinary diligence. Under Article 1735, the mere proof of delivery of the goods to the carrier in good order and their arrival in bad order creates a presumption of the carrier’s fault or negligence. The burden then shifts to the carrier to prove it exercised extraordinary diligence or that the loss was due to an exempting cause under Article 1734. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. She did not present sufficient evidence of the extraordinary precautions taken to prevent the damage. Her mere assertion that the damage could have occurred while the cargo was with other parties is insufficient. Furthermore, the Court noted that any alleged defect in the container vans would not exempt her, as she accepted the cargo without any exception or protest. Consequently, the presumption of negligence stands, making petitioner liable for the damaged goods.