GR 147272; (July, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 147272 ; July 14, 2006
CONRADO B. NICART, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUZ B. TY, respondents.
FACTS
The case originated from a complaint for misappropriation of public funds filed against Municipal Treasurer Luz B. Ty. In her defense, Ty filed an affidavit-complaint accusing then-Mayor Conrado B. Nicart, Jr. of inducing her to violate rules by issuing checks to third parties which were encashed by Nicart’s wife and by withdrawing municipal funds for his benefit. Following a COA audit and preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause and filed an Information for Malversation against both Nicart and Ty before the Sandiganbayan.
Nicart moved for reinvestigation, which was denied. He then filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings to seek a petition for review with the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion, characterizing it as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the court also issued a Resolution suspending Nicart from office for ninety days pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law). Nicart filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan’s orders and his preventive suspension.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) denying Nicart’s Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, and (2) ordering his preventive suspension.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan. On the first issue, the Court held that the denial of the motion to defer proceedings was proper. The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the motion was essentially a second motion for reconsideration of the finding of probable cause, which is prohibited. The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is an executive function. Once the court finds that the information is valid on its face, it acquires jurisdiction and should proceed with the case. The matters Nicart wished to raise were evidentiary and best ventilated during trial, not in a certiorari proceeding.
On the second issue, the Court found the preventive suspension order valid and, in any event, moot. The suspension was mandated under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 , which requires the suspension of an incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for graft is pending. The Sandiganbayan’s order was a ministerial duty upon filing of the information. The Court noted that the suspension period had already lapsed, rendering the issue moot. The petition failed to demonstrate any capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan’s actions were in accordance with law and procedure.
