GR 146728; (February, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 146728 February 11, 2004
General Milling Corporation, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (GMC-ILU), and Rito Mangubat, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) and respondent union had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective until November 30, 1991. A day before its expiry, the union sent GMC a proposed new CBA. GMC, however, refused to negotiate or submit a counter-proposal. GMC claimed it had received letters from workers withdrawing their union membership, thereby doubting the union’s status as the exclusive bargaining agent. The union disputed this, presenting a member manifesto. Subsequently, GMC dismissed a union member and refused to process the grievance under the CBA, referring the union to its earlier letter denying the union’s status.
The union filed an unfair labor practice complaint for refusal to bargain and interference with the right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case, but the NLRC initially found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered it to adopt the union’s proposed CBA draft for two years. The NLRC later reversed itself upon GMC’s motion. The Court of Appeals, however, granted the union’s petition, reinstating the NLRC’s initial decision finding unfair labor practice but deleting the attorney’s fees award.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming that GMC committed unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively and in imposing the union’s proposed CBA draft.
RULING
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals. GMC committed unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively. The union was the duly certified bargaining agent, and the existing CBA’s representation aspect remained effective for five years until November 30, 1993, pursuant to Article 253-A of the Labor Code. GMC’s unilateral doubt about the union’s membership, based on unverified individual letters, did not absolve its duty to bargain in good faith. Its refusal to negotiate, coupled with its refusal to process a grievance under the CBA, constituted clear bad faith.
Given GMC’s bad faith refusal to bargain, the imposition of the union’s proposed CBA draft for the remaining two years of the CBA term was proper. This remedy, established in precedents like Kiok Loy v. NLRC, applies when an employer unduly delays negotiations or refuses to submit a counter-proposal, effectively thwarting the bargaining process. The principle prevents an erring party from benefiting from its own refusal to negotiate. The Court found the draft CBA terms reasonable and affirmed the appellate court’s decision as a fair application of equity to restore the balance between the parties.