GR 146559; (August, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 146559 , August 13, 2004
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LOLITA BESANA, and MARIANO ONG, respondents.
FACTS
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. (petitioner) acted as a surety for a writ of attachment bond in a civil case filed by ARMCO Industrial Corporation against Mariano Ong. When ARMCO failed to pay the bond premiums, petitioner filed motions before the trial court seeking its release from the surety obligation. The trial court, in an order dated May 21, 1999, directed the release of attached properties and stated that petitioner “shall be released of its obligations as surety company immediately after compliance by the plaintiff.” However, the trial court later denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for release in an order dated January 17, 2000, holding that the liability undertaken by the surety remained.
Petitioner received notice of the trial court’s order denying its motion for reconsideration on March 13, 2000. It then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) on May 15, 2000, claiming the last day for filing was May 13, 2000 (a Saturday), making the Monday filing timely.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being filed out of time.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling, emphasizing the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The reglementary period is counted from notice of the assailed order. Petitioner received the denial of its motion for reconsideration on March 13, 2000. Since March has 31 days, the 60th day fell on May 12, 2000 (a Friday), not May 13, 2000 as petitioner erroneously calculated. The petition filed on May 15, 2000 was therefore three days late.
The Court stressed that the 60-day period is reasonable, sufficient, and generally inextendible to prevent needless delays and ensure the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. While procedural rules may be liberally construed, such liberality requires a compelling reason for non-compliance, which petitioner failed to proffer. The policy on liberal construction cannot justify an utter disregard of the rules, especially one that is fundamental to the orderly administration of justice. The general rule on strict compliance must stand.