GR 145233; (May, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 145233 , May 28, 2004
HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Henry Barrera, the Municipal Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales, was indicted before the Sandiganbayan under twenty informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The charges alleged that he, in conspiracy with others, unlawfully prevented legitimate lessee-stallholders from exercising their rights to their assigned stalls at the public market through an allegedly unlawful memorandum. An administrative case was also filed against him. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering his preventive suspension for ninety (90) days. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He then received a memorandum from the DILG implementing the suspension order, prompting him to file the present petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in placing petitioner under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court found the issue had been rendered moot and academic. Petitioner admitted in his memorandum that upon receipt of the resolution directing his preventive suspension, he had already started serving it. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had subsequently dismissed the criminal cases against him. Thus, a determination of the propriety of the suspension would have no practical legal effect on the existing controversy.
The Court, however, proceeded to clarify the applicable legal principle for future guidance. It held that even if the issue were not moot, the petition would still fail. Petitioner contended that suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 should not be automatic and should only apply if there is proof he might intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence. The Court rejected this argument, reiterating established doctrine that Section 13 is mandatory, categorical, and leaves no room for interpretation. The provision unequivocally states that any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information is pending “shall be suspended from office.” The court has neither discretion nor a duty to determine whether the suspension is necessary to prevent the accused from using his office to influence the case; it is automatic upon the filing of a valid information.