G.R. No. 144689 ; June 9, 2005
RAYMUNDO VILLAMOR and WENEFREDA VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF SEBASTIAN TOLANG, et al., respondents.

FACTS

The respondents, heirs of Antonia Tolang, successfully sued the petitioners for annulment of a deed of extra-judicial partition and reconveyance of one-half shares in two lots. The trial court’s 1974 decision, affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court in 1984 and becoming final after the Supreme Court denied review in 1985, declared the partition and subsequent titles void. It ordered the petitioners to convey a one-half share of the lots to the respondents and awarded damages. A writ of execution was issued in 1985, but the sheriff’s return and certification indicating satisfaction were fraudulent, as the signatures of the respondents’ representatives were forged. The respondents were never placed in actual possession of their adjudged share.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the respondents’ motion for a third writ of execution with demolition in 1999. The petitioners challenged this order via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition outright for the petitioners’ failure to comply with procedural requirements, specifically the submission of an affidavit of service and proof of payment of docket fees. The CA denied their motion for reconsideration, prompting this petition for review.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari on purely technical grounds.

RULING

No, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s dismissal. The Court emphasized the primacy of substantive justice but held that procedural rules are not to be disregarded lightly. The petitioners’ non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of submitting an affidavit of service and proof of payment of docket fees under the Rules of Court and relevant circulars was a fatal defect that warranted the dismissal of their special civil action for certiorari. The Court found no compelling reason to relax the rules, as the petitioners failed to show any special circumstance or persuasive justification for their lapse.
Moreover, the Court underscored the final and executory nature of the 1974 judgment. The right to execution is a necessary consequence of finality, and the fraudulent satisfaction of the first writ did not extinguish this right. The trial court’s grant of a third writ to finally place the respondents in possession of their long-adjudged share was a proper exercise of its power to enforce its final judgment. The dismissal of the certiorari petition on technical grounds, while strict, did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as it effectively upheld the prevailing party’s right to the execution of a final and immutable decision.