G.R. No. 144244 . November 11, 2005.
ESTER DELOSO, Petitioner, vs. SPS. ALFONSO MARAPAO and HERMINIA P. MARAPAO, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ester Deloso filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to enforce her alleged tenancy rights over a coconut land owned by respondents. She claimed her first husband, Primitivo Temple, had a sharing agreement with the respondents’ predecessor. After Primitivo’s death and her remarriage in 1986, she asserted she continued to personally cultivate the land and share in its produce, presenting pesadas and vales as evidence. Respondents countered that Primitivo and, later, his son Alberto were merely paid overseers, not tenants. They argued that petitioner relocated to Gingoog City after her remarriage, making personal cultivation impossible, and presented a Time Book and Payroll showing monetary payments.
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), based on an ocular inspection and investigation, found Alberto Temple to be the tenant. The PARAD reversed this, declaring petitioner the tenant, a decision affirmed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the DARAB ruling, reinstating the MARO’s finding and declaring petitioner not a tenant.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the DARAB decision and in ruling that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. On procedural matters, the Court found that the petition filed with the appellate court substantially complied with Rule 43, as the facts and grounds were integrated into its discussion, and no denial of due process occurred. On the substantive issue, the Court upheld the appellate court’s reversal, emphasizing that the DARAB’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The core elements of agricultural tenancy—consent, personal cultivation, and sharing of harvests—were not proven.
Critically, petitioner’s relocation to Gingoog City, a significant distance from the landholding in Butuan City, rendered the claim of personal cultivation implausible. The pesadas and vales she presented were deemed self-serving and insufficient to establish a sharing agreement, especially when contradicted by respondents’ Time Book and Payroll evidencing payment of wages. The Court gave weight to the MARO’s factual findings from the ocular inspection, which were more credible. Since petitioner failed to prove she personally worked the land and shared its produce, no tenancy relationship was established. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the rule that tenancy cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.