GR 143989; (July, 2003) (Digest)

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📌 CORE DOCTRINE

“that on its face, there was a lack of cause of action under the new law, and that even assuming the old law applied, the action had already prescribed.”

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G.R. No. 143989 . July 14, 2003.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as “DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM”), respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Isabelita Lahom and her late husband adopted respondent Jose Melvin Sibulo in 1972. Decades later, in 1999, Isabelita filed a petition to rescind the adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City. She alleged that the respondent refused to use the surname “Lahom,” was indifferent and callous towards her, failed to provide care and support, and had filed a partition case against her over properties, thereby eroding all love and affection. Prior to this petition, Republic Act No. 8552 (the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) took effect.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the petitioner had no cause of action under R.A. No. 8552 , which deleted the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The petitioner opposed, contending that her right to rescind, which allegedly vested under the prior laws (the Civil Code and the Family Code), should be respected and not be retroactively impaired by the new statute. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that on its face, there was a lack of cause of action under the new law, and that even assuming the old law applied, the action had already prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the petition for rescission of adoption.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court held that R.A. No. 8552 , which expressly provides that “adoption shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s),” applies to the case. The law is a curative statute that operates prospectively. Its application to pending actions for rescission filed by adopters does not constitute a retroactive application impairing vested rights. A right to rescind adoption is not a vested right but a mere statutory privilege granted by the state in the exercise of its parens patriae authority to promote the welfare of the child. The state may alter or withdraw this privilege through new legislation. Since the new law removed the adopter’s right to rescind, the petitioner no longer had a cause of action. The Court found no need to delve into the alleged grounds for rescission under the old law, as the governing statute had unequivocally withdrawn the remedy she sought. The dismissal by the trial court was proper.

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