G.R. No. 143397 , August 6, 2002
SANTIAGO ALCANTARA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PENINSULA MANILA, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr., a Commis II and a union director at The Peninsula Manila, Inc., was dismissed for willful disobedience. The dismissal stemmed from his violation of a Hotel Memorandum dated August 7, 1998, which prohibited the use of the union office (located within the hotel premises) from midnight until 6:00 a.m., restricting it to legitimate union activities only during permitted hours. Petitioner was seen inside the union office during the prohibited hours on multiple occasions (August 18, August 20-21, and November 26, 1998) and refused to leave when reminded by security, arguing that the memorandum was inconsistent with the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and unlawful. After disciplinary proceedings, he was terminated on January 4, 1999. The union threatened a strike, leading to a Memorandum of Agreement dated February 4, 1999, which referred the termination issue to Voluntary Arbitrator Noel G. Sanchez. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled the dismissal illegal and ordered reinstatement. The Hotel appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43, which granted the petition and set aside the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly assumed jurisdiction over the Hotel’s appeal from the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Whether petitioner’s dismissal based on willful disobedience was valid.

RULING

1. Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly assumed jurisdiction under Rule 43. The Supreme Court affirmed that a voluntary arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, and awards from voluntary arbitrators are considered final and executory. Pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. A voluntary arbitrator falls within the concept of a “quasi-judicial instrumentality,” making an appeal via Rule 43 proper.
2. No, the dismissal was not valid. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the employer’s order must be lawful and reasonable, and the employee’s disobedience must be willful or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. Here, the Hotel’s memorandum, while a lawful safety regulation, was found unreasonable because it prohibited union office use during hours when the hotel operated 24/7 and when union members, including those on night shift, might need it. The CBA provided the union with an office for exclusive use, and past practice allowed 24-hour access. Petitioner’s refusal to obey was based on an honest belief that the memorandum was unlawful and interfered with union rights, negating a “wrongful and perverse” attitude. His dismissal was too severe a penalty; under the Hotel’s own House Code of Discipline, the violation (a safety rule infraction) for a third offense warranted only a three-day suspension, not dismissal. The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution, declared the dismissal illegal, and ordered petitioner’s immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with payment of back wages from dismissal to actual reinstatement, less three days’ wages corresponding to a suspension period.