GR 142308; (November, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 142308 November 15, 2005
SPS. REV. ELMER J. BAÑES & ANGELA BAÑES, SPS. REV. MANUEL DEL ROSARIO & GUIA DEL ROSARIO, and SPS. PEDRO SAN RAMON & NENITA SAN RAMON, Petitioners, vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES, OSCAR ALMAZAN, JAMES CERDENOLA, LUIS AO-AS, EDWINO MERCADO, ANTONIO REYES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, clergymen of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP), were occupants of church-owned residential houses within the LCP compound. An intra-corporate dispute within the LCP led to a SEC-issued writ of preliminary injunction against one faction, which included petitioners. On August 13, 1993, the opposing faction, respondents, with the aid of law enforcement and a sheriff, padlocked the main gate of the compound, posted security guards, and attempted to dispossess petitioners. Petitioners refused to leave. Subsequently, petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote letters to the opposing faction’s leader, requesting extensions to stay while they looked for new housing, and they eventually vacated the premises. The San Ramon spouses also later left.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the petitioners’ subsequent letters requesting an extension of stay and their eventual voluntary vacation of the premises constitute a waiver of their right to file an action for forcible entry.
RULING
No, the petitioners’ acts did not constitute a waiver of their right to file forcible entry. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the forcible entry case but clarified the legal reasoning. Forcible entry is a quieting process aimed at preventing breaches of peace and criminal disorder by restoring physical possession to one who has been dispossessed by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The one-year prescriptive period to file such an action is counted from the date of actual dispossession.
The Court ruled that the dispossession occurred on August 13, 1993, when respondents padlocked the gates and stationed guards, thereby depriving petitioners of their right to free access and possession. The letters written by Bañes and Del Rosario in September 1993, which merely requested an extension of stay due to practical difficulties, did not constitute a voluntary surrender of possession or a recognition of the respondents’ lawful authority. These were pleas for consideration, not concessions of the respondents’ right to dispossess them. The subsequent voluntary vacation, undertaken after the forcible deprivation had already occurred, did not retroactively validate the illegal dispossession or waive the cause of action that had already accrued. The filing of the forcible entry case in December 1993 was therefore within the one-year prescriptive period from the August 1993 dispossession. However, the Court ultimately upheld the dismissal based on the final and executory nature of the lower court’s judgment, applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.