G.R. No. 141851 ; January 16, 2002
DIRECT FUNDERS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE CELSO D. LAVIÑA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-Pasig City, Branch 71 and KAMBIAK Y. CHAN, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Direct Funders Holdings Corporation acquired a property through a foreclosure sale and was granted a writ of possession by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 157. Respondent Kambiak Y. Chan, Jr., claiming a prior right, filed a separate action for annulment of documents and reconveyance before RTC Pasig, Branch 71, and applied for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Despite being informed of the existing writ of possession from a coordinate court, respondent Judge Laviña issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction, thereby restoring possession to Chan and effectively restraining the enforcement of the writ issued by Branch 157.
Petitioner challenged the injunction via a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion by interfering with a lawful order of a co-equal court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and that it did not constitute improper interference. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that restrained the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by a coordinate court, thereby raising the question of who between the petitioner and the respondent has a better right to possession of the subject property.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ruled in favor of petitioner Direct Funders. The Court held that petitioner has a superior right to possession based on a valid and enforceable real estate mortgage, its subsequent foreclosure, and the issuance of a writ of possession. In contrast, respondent Chan’s claim derived from an unfulfilled conditional sale agreement executed without the consent of the original mortgagee, constituting a material breach of the mortgage contract. Since the conditions of the sale were not consummated and the agreement was neither registered nor annotated on the title, it created no effective right against petitioner.
The Court emphasized that a writ of possession, once issued, is a ministerial duty, and a coordinate court cannot nullify or interfere with it through an injunction, as this undermines judicial stability and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The respondent judge’s order effectively disturbed a prior lawful possession, warranting reversal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the civil case before the RTC Branch 71, including all counterclaims.