GR 141530; (March, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 141530 ; March 18, 2003
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the National Centennial Commission) vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Christopher Lock, Fe A. Manuel, and Metrobank, Cavite City Branch.
FACTS
The National Centennial Commission (NCC) filed a complaint for expropriation against Fe Manuel and Metrobank to acquire Manuel’s land in Cavite for the Centennial Freedom Trail project, specifically for the Tejeros Convention Center. The property had been declared a historical landmark. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, ruling the NCC lacked cause of action due to the absence of a prior presidential determination on the necessity of expropriation and written authority for the Solicitor General to institute the case. The RTC also noted the NCC’s limited lifespan under its charter.
Petitioner received the RTC order denying its motion for reconsideration on October 12, 1998. On December 11, 1998, it filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition as filed out of time. It applied the amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on September 1, 1998. This amendment stated the 60-day period to file a certiorari petition should be reckoned from notice of the assailed judgment, not from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Counting from the original May 1998 dismissal order, the filing was late.
ISSUE
Was the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals filed on time?
RULING
Yes, the petition was filed on time. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the CA’s resolutions. The legal logic centers on the retroactive application of a subsequent procedural amendment. After the CA’s dismissal, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, effective September 1, 2000, which reverted Section 4, Rule 65 to its original formulation: the 60-day period is counted from notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Procedural rules, such as those governing periods for appeal, are generally retroactive in application. They do not create or destroy vested rights but operate in furtherance of existing remedies. The Court has consistently held that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC applies retroactively to pending cases. Therefore, the correct reckoning point for petitioner’s period to file was October 12, 1998 (receipt of the denial of reconsideration). Filing on December 11, 1998, was precisely on the 60th day, making the petition timely. The CA erred in applying the interim amendment strictly without considering the subsequent retroactive corrective rule. The case was remanded to the CA for proceedings on the merits of the expropriation complaint.