GR 141309; (June, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 141309 ; June 19, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93) reclassifying respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation’s cigarette brands “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, thereby subjecting them to a higher 55% ad valorem tax under the impending Republic Act No. 7654. The Supreme Court, in a prior case, ultimately declared RMC 37-93 invalid for failing to meet the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. Subsequently, Fortune Tobacco filed a complaint for damages against Chato in her private capacity under Article 32 of the Civil Code, alleging the circular violated its constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
Chato moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing she acted in her official capacity, making the state responsible for her acts, and that the complaint failed to allege malice or bad faith required for a public officer’s liability. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even without allegations of malice or bad faith for violations of constitutional rights.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code against a public officer in her private capacity must allege malice or bad faith to state a cause of action.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights, can proceed without any allegation of malice or bad faith. The Court clarified the relationship between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code. Section 38 governs the general civil liability of public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties, which requires a showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. In contrast, Article 32 is a special provision that establishes a distinct civil action for the violation of specific constitutional rights. This action is sui generis and exists independently of the general rules on official liability.
The legal logic is that Article 32 was designed as a deterrent to protect constitutional liberties by imposing civil liability directly on the violator, regardless of whether the act was done in an official capacity or with wrongful intent. The absence of terms like “malice” or “bad faith” in Article 32, compared to their explicit requirement in other related articles like Article 27, indicates a deliberate legislative intent to make the exercise of constitutional rights actionable per se upon their violation. Therefore, Fortune Tobacco’s complaint, which alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights through the invalid issuance of RMC 37-93, sufficiently stated a cause of action under Article 32 without needing to plead malice. The denial of the motion to dismiss was proper.
