GR 140560; (May, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 140560 & G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents. / PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, represented by RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents.
FACTS
Jovito O. Claudio was the duly elected Mayor of Pasay City, assuming office on July 1, 1998. On May 29, 1999, a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) composed of barangay officials adopted a resolution for his recall due to loss of confidence. The petition for recall was formally filed with the COMELEC on July 2, 1999. Mayor Claudio opposed the petition, arguing it was filed within the one-year prohibited period from his assumption of office, among other procedural defects.
The COMELEC, in a resolution dated October 18, 1999, gave due course to the recall petition. It ruled that the recall process commences only upon the filing of the petition, which occurred on July 2, 1999—one year and a day after Claudio’s assumption—thus complying with the one-year bar. It also found the PRA was validly constituted by a majority of its members.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the recall petition against Mayor Claudio, specifically on the ground that it was filed within the one-year prohibited period.
RULING
The Supreme Court, voting 8-6, dismissed Claudio’s petition and upheld the COMELEC resolution. The legal logic centered on the interpretation of Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code, which states that “no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office.” The Court agreed with the COMELEC’s construction that the prohibited act is the holding of the recall election itself, not the preparatory steps like convening the PRA or filing the petition. The term “recall” in the prohibition refers to the election day. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, and any election would be scheduled thereafter, the one-year ban was not violated. The Court found this interpretation consistent with the statutory scheme, which separately regulates the initiation process and the election date. No grave abuse of discretion was found in the COMELEC’s application of this interpretation. The companion mandamus petition (G.R. No. 140714) was dismissed as moot, as the COMELEC had already set the recall election date.