GR 140358; (December, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 140358 ; December 8, 2000
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), represented by ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, Office of the Ombudsman, et al., respondents.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans investigated a loan obtained by the Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation (PCFC) from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee found the loan exhibited characteristics of a “behest loan,” such as being undercollateralized, granted to an undercapitalized corporation, bearing endorsements from a high government official, involving a Marcos crony, and being processed with unusual haste. Based on this, the Committee filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals, including DBP officers and the principal stockholder, for alleged violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, citing lack of a prima facie case and, critically, that the offense had prescribed. The Ombudsman held that the alleged acts were committed between 1973 and 1977, and since the violations occurred prior to the 1982 amendment to R.A. 3019, the ten-year prescriptive period under the old law applied and had lapsed. The PCGG’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The PCGG then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was initially dismissed for being filed three days late.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of the offense.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration, set aside its earlier dismissal, and ultimately nullified the Ombudsman’s resolutions. On procedural grounds, the Court applied the retroactive effect of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which amended the Rules of Court to clarify that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is counted from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. This rendered the PCGG’s petition timely filed.
On the substantive issue of prescription, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated the doctrine established in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto that for violations of R.A. 3019, the prescriptive period does not begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation if the same was “not known at the time.” The period commences only from the discovery of the offense. The Court emphasized that behest loans, by their clandestine and conspiratorial nature, are inherently difficult to discover. The discovery in this case occurred only upon the investigation by the Fact-Finding Committee created in 1992. Therefore, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period. The Ombudsman’s rigid application of the commencement date from the commission of the alleged acts, ignoring the “discovery rule,” was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The case was remanded to the Ombudsman for further proceedings.