G.R. No. 140335 ; December 13, 2000
THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents.

FACTS

On June 11, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Thelma P. Gaminde as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Her appointment paper explicitly stated her term would expire on “February 2, 1999.” She assumed office on June 22, 1993, and her appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on September 7, 1993. In 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President regarding her term’s expiry. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term would end on February 2, 2000. Relying on this, she remained in office after February 2, 1999.
Subsequently, the CSC Chairman requested the Commission on Audit (COA) for an opinion on the payment of Gaminde’s salary. COA’s General Counsel opined that her term expired on February 2, 1999, as per her appointment paper. Consequently, the resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance for her salaries and those of her staff from that date. Petitioner appealed to the COA en banc, which affirmed the disallowance, holding it lacked power to recognize any term extension. Her motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the term of office of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in her appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner’s term expired on February 2, 1999. The Court anchored its decision on the constitutional mandate for a fixed, seven-year term for CSC Commissioners without reappointment and the imperative of a rotational system. The 1987 Constitution , Article IX-B, Section 1(2), provides for staggered terms for the first appointees (seven, five, and three years) to ensure continuity and independence. For this rotational scheme to function, the terms of the first Commissioners under the 1987 Constitution must be reckoned from a common date.
The Court established February 2, 1987, the date of the Constitution’s ratification, as that common starting point. Therefore, the first set of seven, five, and three-year terms commenced on that date. Any subsequent appointment to a vacancy, such as petitioner’s, is only “for the unexpired term of the predecessor.” The predecessor Commissioner, who was appointed to a seven-year term starting February 2, 1987, had a term expiring on February 1, 1994. Petitioner was appointed to this vacancy. Consequently, her term began upon her qualification on June 22, 1993, and ended on February 1, 1994, completing the unexpired portion. She was then appointed to a full seven-year term, which commenced the day after the predecessor’s term ended, on February 2, 1994. This full seven-year term thus expired on February 1, 2001. However, her appointment paper, which she accepted, explicitly limited this term to February 2, 1999. The Court held that while the Constitution sets the maximum term, an appointee may accept a shorter term, as petitioner did. Therefore, by the clear terms of her appointment, which she did not contest at the time, her tenure ended on February 2, 1999. The COA correctly disallowed the salaries paid beyond that date.