GR 140244; (August, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 140244 ; August 29, 2000
Joel R. Umandap, petitioner, vs. Hon. Judge Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and Domingo F. Estomo, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Domingo Estomo filed an action for damages against petitioner Joel Umandap. The process server, after allegedly failing to serve the summons personally, effected substituted service on February 3, 1998, by leaving copies at Umandap’s home and office address with a certain Joseph David, who refused to acknowledge receipt. Umandap failed to answer, was declared in default, and a judgment was rendered against him ordering payment of various sums. A writ of execution was subsequently issued, garnishing his assets.
Umandap filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and quash the writ, arguing the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person due to invalid substituted service. He contended the process server’s return failed to detail the efforts made to effect personal service. The trial court denied his motions, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which found the return valid and regular on its face and presumed regular performance of duty by the process server.
ISSUE
Whether the substituted service of summons upon petitioner was valid, thereby vesting the trial court with jurisdiction over his person.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the substituted service was valid. While personal service is the general rule, substituted service under Rule 14, Section 7 is allowed when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time. The process server’s return indicated that earnest efforts to serve personally had failed, justifying the resort to substituted service by leaving copies at the defendant’s residence and office.
The Court emphasized that sheriffs’ returns enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties under the Rules of Evidence. This presumption was not overcome by petitioner’s bare and self-serving denial. Furthermore, the Court found that petitioner had actual knowledge of the proceedings, as evidenced by his subsequent receipt of the order of default and the judgment itself via registered mail. His failure to act promptly upon these receipts constituted laches. Having slept on his rights, he could not later assail the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment by default was therefore valid.