GR 139907; (March, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 139907 ; March 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELO BATES, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The prosecution’s evidence established that on November 28, 1995, Jose Boholst was walking with companions when Carlito Bates emerged and aimed a firearm at him. A struggle ensued, and the gun fired, hitting Carlito. Immediately, accused-appellant Marcelo Bates and his son, armed with bolos, emerged and repeatedly hacked Jose, who was unarmed and unable to defend himself. Jose’s wife witnessed the hacking and pleaded in vain for them to stop. Jose died from his injuries. The defense presented a different version, claiming that Marcelo acted in self-defense. He testified that he saw Jose shoot his brother, Carlito, and that Jose also fired at him, prompting him to hack Jose in retaliation.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) whether accused-appellant acted in self-defense; and (2) whether the killing was qualified by treachery to constitute Murder.
RULING
The Supreme Court rejected the claim of self-defense. When an accused admits the killing but invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to him to establish by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court found accused-appellant’s version unconvincing and insufficient to discharge this burden. His claim that the unarmed victim fired a gun at him was not credible, especially given the prosecution witnesses’ consistent testimonies that the victim was unarmed and attacked suddenly. However, the Court also ruled that treachery was not proven. The qualifying circumstance of treachery requires that the means of execution were deliberately adopted to ensure the attack without risk to the assailant. The evidence showed that the attack commenced during a spontaneous, heated altercation involving the accused’s brother. The suddenness of the attack by itself does not constitute treachery when it arose from a chance encounter or a tumultuous affray. Thus, the crime committed was Homicide, not Murder. The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence. The Court also corrected the trial court’s erroneous imposition of “forty years of reclusion perpetua,” noting that reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty with no fixed duration.
