G.R. No. 139409 . March 18, 2002.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIGIO CIRON, JR., ALEX ALDAY (At large) and BELEN L. CIRON (Acquitted), accused, ELIGIO CIRON, JR., accused-appellant.

FACTS

The prosecution’s eyewitness, Isidra Gonzales, testified that on November 20, 1988, she saw accused-appellant Eligio Ciron, Jr., Alex Alday, and Belen Ciron in front of her house. Alday was shouting challenges. Upon seeing the victim, Francisco Borja, Alday and Ciron approached him. Alday initially boxed the victim, then stabbed him in the chin. At that moment, accused-appellant grabbed the victim from behind and stabbed him three times in the back, causing the victim to fall. The assailants fled, and the victim later died from his wounds. The post-mortem examination confirmed stab wounds to the heart, lung, and kidney as the cause of death.
For his defense, accused-appellant claimed he merely chanced upon Alday in the act of stabbing the victim. He asserted that he tried to pacify Alday but retreated for fear of being harmed, denying any participation in the killing. The Regional Trial Court convicted him of Murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay indemnity and actual damages. He appealed, arguing the trial court disregarded his testimony.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of Murder by disregarding his testimony and the credibility of the prosecution witness.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Court upheld the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, emphasizing that the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses. The testimony of eyewitness Isidra Gonzales was found clear, consistent, and credible, positively identifying accused-appellant as a direct participant who stabbed the victim from behind. This account was corroborated by the medical findings on the location and nature of the wounds.
The Court rejected accused-appellant’s denial and his claim of being a mere bystander. His defense was inherently weak and could not prevail over the positive and categorical identification by the prosecution witness. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly established, as the attack was sudden and from behind, rendering the victim unable to defend himself. The Court also modified the award of damages, adding moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity, computed based on the victim’s age and proven income. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was affirmed.