G.R. No. 138882 May 12, 2000
JOSE S. LIZARDO, SR. vs. ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO

FACTS

On April 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City rendered a final and executory decision in a collection case (Civil Case No. C-9009) in favor of petitioner Jose S. Lizardo, Sr. against Eddie H. Mirano. The dispositive portion ordered Mirano to pay Lizardo a principal sum plus 12% interest and “the sum equivalent to 25% of the amount payable… as attorney’s fees.” The judgment was fully executed and satisfied by 1985 through a sheriff’s auction of Mirano’s property, which was awarded to Lizardo. Title was consolidated in Lizardo’s name by September 1986.
Thirteen years after the decision and over ten years after its full satisfaction, on January 5, 1996, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano, who was Lizardo’s counsel in the original case, filed an omnibus motion in the same RTC for payment of his attorney’s fees. Without a hearing, the RTC, then presided by a different judge, issued an order on January 29, 1996, directing Lizardo to pay Montano “the agreed attorney’s fees of 25% on the property” or to have an attorney’s lien annotated on the title. Lizardo challenged this order.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction in 1996 to issue an order directing the payment of attorney’s fees, thereby substantially varying the terms of a long-final and fully executed judgment.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner Lizardo, declaring the RTC’s 1996 order void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court’s legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of finality of judgments and the limited jurisdiction of a court after a decision becomes final. A court loses jurisdiction over a case upon the finality of its decision, retaining it only for the ministerial act of issuing a writ of execution within a prescribed period. The 1983 decision had become final and executory in 1983 and was completely executed by 1985; thus, the case was terminated long before 1996. Consequently, the trial court could no longer revive the case or issue substantive orders.
Furthermore, the 1996 order constituted an impermissible amendment of the final judgment. The original 1983 decision clearly ordered the defendant, Mirano, to pay attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, Lizardo. In contrast, the 1996 order directed Lizardo (the plaintiff) to pay attorney’s fees to his own counsel, Montano. This was a substantial variance, not a mere clerical correction, which a court can no longer effect after losing jurisdiction. The proper remedy for Montano to collect his fees was an independent civil action against Lizardo, not a motion in a long-terminated case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the RTC’s order.