GR 138596; (October, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 138596 ; October 12, 2000
SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, respondents.
FACTS
The alleged libel, involving a circulated letter, occurred on December 21, 1993. Private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit before the Quezon City Prosecutor on February 2, 1994, interrupting the one-year prescriptive period which had already run for 42 days. An Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) on May 18, 1994. After the prosecution presented evidence, the MeTC, instead of ruling on the demurrer to evidence, discovered it lacked jurisdiction over libel and forwarded the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on November 9, 1996. The first RTC branch dismissed the case on April 2, 1997, ordering re-filing due to the improper filing procedure, but held the crime had not prescribed. The Information was re-filed on April 27, 1997.
ISSUE
Whether the crime of libel had already prescribed, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the crime of libel had not prescribed. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information and begins to run again only when proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal. The filing of the complaint-affidavit on February 2, 1994, effectively tolled the prescription. The subsequent proceedings, including the erroneous filing with the MeTC and the transfer to the RTC, constituted a continuation of the initially instituted action. The Court, citing Francisco v. Court of Appeals, emphasized that prescription remains tolled during the pendency of proceedings, even if flawed by jurisdictional errors, provided they are not attributable to the accused. The period did not start running anew until the first RTC branch dismissed the case on April 2, 1997, and the re-filing occurred well within the remaining period. The Court also found no violation of the right to a speedy trial, as the delays were partly attributable to petitioner’s own motions.