G.R. No. 138042 . February 28, 2001.
JOSEFINA AND MAMERTO R. PALON, petitioners, vs. GIL AND FLOCERFIDA S. NINO, BRILLANTE and LORNA CALAMIGAN, ALFREDO IGNACIO CERVANTES and LEONILA CERVANTES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Josefina Palon owned a 200-square meter lot in Quezon City. On December 4, 1989, and March 5, 1990, she entered into three separate agreements titled “Buod ng Kasunduan” with three sets of spouses-respondents, selling each an undivided 50-square meter portion. The respondents fully paid the purchase prices. Josefina then executed corresponding “Sale of Segregated Portion of Land” deeds, promising separate titles after reconstituting the original title lost in a fire. After securing a reconstituted title, subdivision surveys were undertaken to segregate the sold portions. A dispute arose over the location of a permanent right of way in the subdivision plans. Josefina subsequently refused to cooperate in finalizing the plans and having the titles issued, prompting respondents to file suits for specific performance.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering Josefina Palon to execute the necessary deeds and take all steps to secure separate titles for the respondents.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The legal logic is anchored on the nature and obligations arising from a contract of sale. The “Buod ng Kasunduan” agreements, coupled with the full payment by the respondents and the subsequent execution of formal deeds of sale, perfected contracts of sale over determinate portions of the land. Josefina, as vendor, was consequently bound by the reciprocal obligation under Article 1358 of the Civil Code to execute a public instrument formalizing the sale. More critically, her obligation extended to doing all acts necessary to transfer ownership, which includes causing the approval of a subdivision plan and facilitating the issuance of separate certificates of title in the buyers’ names. Her refusal to cooperate after receiving full payment, based on a belated objection to the location of a right of way—a detail not stipulated in the original agreements and which was a necessary consequence of subdividing the property for titling—constituted a breach of her contractual duties. The Court found no merit in her defenses, as the respondents’ primary demand was merely for her to comply with her end of the perfected contracts. Thus, the order for specific performance was proper to compel her to fulfill her contractual obligations and complete the transfer of titles to the respondents.