GR 137980; (November, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 137980 . November 15, 2000. TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Tala Realty filed an ejectment case against respondent Banco Filipino, primarily alleging the expiration of the lease contract and the latter’s refusal to accept new rental terms. In its Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s prior Decision, Banco Filipino argued that the complaint was not based on non-payment of rentals and that this issue should not have been passed upon. The Court, however, noted that the issue of non-payment was consistently raised from the Municipal Trial Court upwards, with Tala Realty’s Position Paper explicitly citing respondent’s failure to pay any rent since April 1994 as a ground for ejectment.
Respondent further contended that the application of its security deposit to cover unpaid rentals for August 1985 to November 1989 was erroneous and unilateral, violating the lease contract which stipulated the deposit was for rentals from the 11th to the 20th year. It also argued that its closure and placement under Central Bank receivership constituted a fortuitous event that should excuse it from liability for unpaid rentals during that period, shifting responsibility to the Central Bank.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court correctly denied the Motion for Reconsideration, affirming the grounds for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals and the proper application of the security deposit.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration with finality. The legal logic is clear: the issue of non-payment of rentals was properly before the Court as it was substantively alleged and argued in the pleadings throughout the judicial hierarchy. The application of the security deposit to the unpaid rentals for 1985-1989 was justified and not a unilateral amendment of the contract. The contractual stipulation for the deposit’s application to the later years presupposed that rental payments for the earlier years were current. Since respondent had a substantial arrears for the 5th to 8th years, applying the deposit to cover this default was necessary to prevent immediate ejectment at that time; respondent cannot now demand the deposit be reserved for future periods while ignoring past defaults.
Regarding the claim of fortuitous event due to closure and receivership, the Court ruled this is immaterial in an ejectment case, which is a summary action to recover physical possession. The lessee’s obligation to pay rent is exclusive under the lease contract. Any right of action respondent may have against the Central Bank for its closure is a separate matter to be pursued in the proper forum and does not absolve its direct contractual liability to the lessor. The principle of res judicata from a related case does not apply because the factual ground for ejectment here—non-payment of rent starting April 1994—was distinct and justified a different outcome.
