G.R. No. 136433 ; December 6, 2006
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R. SALENGA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio Baltazar filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against private respondents, namely, DAR Legal Officers Eulogio Mariano and Jose Jimenez, Jr., Provincial Adjudicator Toribio Ilao, Jr., and fishpond watchman Ernesto Salenga. The complaint alleged a conspiracy to violate Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The controversy stemmed from an agrarian case (DARAB Case No. 552-P’93) filed by Salenga against a sub-lessee for unpaid wages and a share of the harvest. In that case, Jimenez, Jr. acted as Salenga’s counsel, and Adjudicator Ilao, Jr. issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing Salenga to retain possession and supervise the harvest. Baltazar, alleging to be a nephew of the landowner’s attorney-in-fact, claimed the DARAB had no jurisdiction as no tenancy relationship existed, and that the TRO granted unwarranted benefits to Salenga.
The Ombudsman initially found probable cause and filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan. However, upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Ilao, Jr., the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) reversed its stance. In an Order approved by the Ombudsman, the OSP recommended the dismissal of the Information, reasoning that the issuance of the TRO was a judicial act performed within Ilao, Jr.’s official functions and that there was no evidence of bad faith or manifest partiality. The Ombudsman denied Baltazar’s motion for reconsideration, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint and withdrawing the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan.

RULING

No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is an executive function primarily vested in the Ombudsman. Judicial review of such determination is limited to checking for arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion. The Court found none in this case.
The legal logic rests on the nature of the assailed acts and the elements of the crime. For a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act must be performed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court upheld the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent Ilao, Jr., in issuing the TRO, was performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The TRO was issued after an ex-parte hearing where the opposing parties failed to appear despite notice. The act was within his official jurisdiction, and mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction, if any, does not equate to bad faith or manifest partiality absent clear evidence of a corrupt motive. The subsequent dismissal of Salenga’s main complaint by Ilao, Jr. himself further negated any allegation of conspiracy to grant unwarranted benefits. The Court also noted the petitioner’s questionable legal standing, as he was not a direct party to the agrarian case. Therefore, the Ombudsman’s reversal, based on a re-evaluation of the evidence, was a valid exercise of discretion and not undertaken in a capricious or whimsical manner.