GR 136207; (June, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 136207 ; June 21, 2005
HEIRS OF THE LATE FLOR TUNGPALAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES NAVARRO R. EUSTAQUIO and ARABELLA K. EUSTAQUIO and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioners filed a complaint for reformation, reconveyance, and nullification of title against the respondents. After multiple postponements of the pre-trial conference, the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial on March 2, 1993. Consequently, the trial court issued an Order dated March 8, 1993, declaring the petitioners non-suited and dismissing both the complaint and the compulsory counterclaim. The petitioners received a copy of this Order on May 14, 1993.
One year and seven months later, on October 6, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court initially granted this motion on November 15, 1994, revoking its earlier dismissal. However, upon the respondents’ motion arguing that the court had lost jurisdiction, the trial court reversed itself in an Order dated December 22, 1994, reinstating the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed this reinstatement, prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s Order reinstating the dismissal of the complaint, despite the petitioners’ claim of their former counsel’s negligence.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of finality of judgments and the petitioners’ own negligence. The Order of dismissal dated March 8, 1993, became final and executory on May 29, 1993, fifteen days after the petitioners received it, as they failed to appeal or file a timely motion for reconsideration. Once a judgment becomes final, the court loses jurisdiction to amend or revoke it. The trial court, therefore, correctly held that its subsequent Order of November 15, 1994, reviving the case, was issued without jurisdiction.
The petitioners’ attempt to attribute the delay solely to their counsel’s negligence is unavailing. The records show that the petitioners themselves received separate notices and a copy of the dismissal Order. Their inaction for over a year and seven months demonstrated a lack of vigilance and interest in prosecuting their case. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. Furthermore, the dismissal for failure to prosecute, as decreed by the March 8, 1993 Order which did not specify it was without prejudice, operates as an adjudication on the merits, barring the refiling of the same action.