G.R. No. 136203 . September 16, 1999.
LORENO TERRY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS

On August 13, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, in Civil Case No. 740, declared Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla the lawful owners of Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627, against petitioner Loreño Terry. Petitioner did not appeal. On November 22, 1979, the trial court issued a writ of execution against petitioner, but it was not served and became stale after five years. On December 9, 1985, more than six years later, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution. On January 13, 1986, the sheriff’s return stated petitioner was no longer in occupation of the lots, and possession was turned over to Leoncia Arcilla. On July 5, 1991, Leoncia Arcilla filed a separate action (Civil Case No. 1586) for reconveyance and recovery of possession against petitioner, which was dismissed on October 27, 1992. On March 27, 1995, Leoncia Arcilla filed a motion for contempt in Civil Case No. 740, alleging petitioner re-occupied Lot No. 13118. On March 19, 1996, the trial court found petitioner guilty of contempt, sentencing him to two months imprisonment and a fine, later modified on May 2, 1996, to one month imprisonment, a fine, and an order to vacate the lots. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, reinstating the two-month imprisonment and P500.00 fine and affirming the order to vacate.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner’s re-entry on the disputed lots and exercise of acts of ownership constitute indirect contempt.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner’s re-entry did not constitute indirect contempt. The alias writ of execution issued on December 9, 1985, was null and void because it was issued beyond the five-year period from the finality of the 1979 judgment within which execution could be issued by motion. After the lapse of five years, the judgment could only be enforced through an independent action for revival of judgment. The original judgment itself had become stale by September 1989, ten years after its finality. Consequently, when the motion for contempt was filed in 1995, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 740. The orders declaring petitioner in contempt were void, as contempt requires willful disobedience to a valid order. The order to vacate the lots was also improper in a contempt proceeding, as it effectively revived the stale judgment without an independent action. The petition was granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and petitioner was acquitted of the contempt charge.