G.R. No. 135886 . August 16, 1999.
VICTORINO SALCEDO II, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO, respondents.

FACTS

On February 18, 1968, Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without this marriage being dissolved, Neptali married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony on September 21, 1986. Two days later, on September 23, 1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre. Both petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo ran for mayor of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections. On April 17, 1998, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that she made a false representation by stating her surname as “Salcedo,” arguing she had no right to use it as she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected mayor on May 13, 1998. In her answer, private respondent claimed she had no knowledge of Neptali’s existing marriage at the time of their marriage, that Neptali and Jesus Aguirre were the same person, and that Neptali had filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Agnes Celiz, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court on April 8, 1998. The COMELEC Second Division, on August 12, 1998, ruled that since a valid marriage existed between Neptali and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage with private respondent was null and void, and her use of the surname “Salcedo” constituted material misrepresentation, warranting cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. However, the COMELEC en banc, on October 6, 1998, reversed this, ruling that private respondent’s certificate of candidacy contained no material misrepresentation as she could use her husband’s surname under Article 370 of the Civil Code, and that any defect should give way to the will of the electorate after her proclamation.

ISSUE

Whether the use by private respondent of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy constitutes a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court held that the use of the surname “Salcedo” does not constitute a material misrepresentation. The Court ruled that a candidate’s use of a surname, when done in good faith and for a considerable length of time, even if not legally entitled to it, is not a material misrepresentation that affects eligibility for public office. The Court emphasized that the material misrepresentation contemplated by election law refers to a false statement regarding a qualification for elective office prescribed by the Constitution or statute. The qualifications for local elective officials, such as mayor, are outlined in the Local Government Code and do not include the use of a legal surname. The Court found that private respondent had been using the surname “Salcedo” since 1986 in all her transactions, indicating good faith. Furthermore, the Court noted that after the election and the proclamation of private respondent, any defect in the certificate of candidacy should be considered directory, and the will of the electorate must be respected. The COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Second Division’s resolution. The petition was dismissed.