G.R. No. 135482 , August 14, 2001
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, REPRESENTED BY ORLANDO S. SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, FRANCISCO TEODORO and LETICIA TEODORO, respondents.

FACTS

On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to inventory behest loans and recommend action. Its functions were later expanded by Memorandum No. 61 to include non-performing loans. A Technical Working Group (TWG), with Atty. Orlando Salvador as a coordinator, examined loan accounts. One account referred was that of Apparel World, Inc. (Apparel). On April 8, 1974, Apparel applied for an Import Letter of Credit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) for DM15,000,000.00. PNB approved the loan on May 5, 1974, less than a month later, with collateral consisting only of the joint and solidary agreement of respondents Francisco and Leticia Teodoro and a chattel mortgage on machinery. By May 15, 1986, Apparel’s unpaid loan deficiency amounted to P170,967,849.58. The Committee classified Apparel’s account as a BEHEST LOAN. On January 26, 1998, Atty. Salvador filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Francisco Teodoro, Leticia Teodoro, Jose Tabora, and Panfilo O. Domingo. On April 14, 1998, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, prescription, and because Memorandum Order No. 61 and Administrative Order No. 13 were considered as ex post facto laws. The Ombudsman held that prescription began to run from the execution of the loan in 1974, well beyond the prescriptive period, and that the 1992 issuances classifying behest loans had the effect of ex post facto laws.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against the respondents on the grounds of prescription and by treating Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum No. 61 as ex post facto laws.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. On the issue of prescription, the Court held that under Act No. 3326 , Section 2, prescription for violations of R.A. No. 3019 begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if not known at the time, from its discovery. Citing recent jurisprudence, the Court stated that it was nearly impossible for the State to have known the violations at the time the transactions were made if public officials connived with the loan beneficiaries. Therefore, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission, not from the day of commission. Hence, prescription had not set in. However, on the propriety of the Ombudsman’s dismissal, the Court ruled that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 , absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court found that the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman provided reasons for the dismissal, including that the Committee failed to provide the proper valuation of Apparel’s property and thus erred in finding insufficient collateral and capital, and that it was not established that Francisco Teodoro was an associate or crony of President Marcos. The Court upheld the Ombudsman’s independence in determining that there was no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents violated R.A. No. 3019 .