GR 134568; (February, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 134568 February 10, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EULOGIO IGNACIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The prosecution established that on January 11, 1997, in Dimasalang, Masbate, the 14-year-old victim, Jessie Lacson, and his companion, Edwin Velasco, were gathering shells and became thirsty. They proceeded to a fishpond, owned by Cleto Cortes and cared for by accused-appellant Eulogio Ignacio, to get a young coconut. After obtaining one, Jessie walked ahead towards a dike. Appellant emerged from his house, shouted at Jessie to drop the coconut, and then, from a distance of 40 meters, fired a homemade shotgun at the unarmed minor, hitting him fatally in the chest. Edwin, who witnessed the shooting from behind trees, reported the incident. Barangay tanods later went to appellant’s house; upon his arrival, he surrendered himself and the weapon.
The defense presented a different account. Appellant claimed he was the fishpond’s caretaker and had been informed of prior thefts. On the day in question, he allegedly saw Jessie and Edwin coming out of his house carrying a basket and fleeing. He ordered them to stop and, when they did not, fired his gun without intent to kill. He subsequently reported the incident to barangay officials.
ISSUE
The core issues were: (1) whether the killing was qualified by treachery, and (2) whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court found treachery (alevosia) to be present. The essence of treachery is the deliberate and sudden attack on an unarmed victim, depriving them of any chance to defend themselves. Here, the victim was a minor, unarmed, and had just complied with appellant’s order to drop the coconut. The attack was executed in a manner that ensured the victim could offer no resistance, thereby qualifying the homicide as murder.
Regarding voluntary surrender, the Court ruled it was not present. For this mitigating circumstance to apply, the surrender must be voluntary, signifying an unconditional intent to submit to authorities out of acknowledgment of guilt or to spare them the effort of capture. The evidence showed appellant surrendered only after barangay tanods were already present inside his house, a situation which effectively precluded his escape. Thus, his submission was not spontaneous or voluntary but was compelled by the circumstances. The appeal was denied.