GR 134113; (October, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 134113 . October 12, 2005.
AIR FRANCE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE EMILIO L. LEACHON (Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 224) and LUMEN POLICARPIO, Respondents.
FACTS
In 1980, respondent Lumen Policarpio filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Air France Philippines in the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City. The parties entered into an amicable settlement via a “Release and Quitclaim,” leading to a joint motion for dismissal with prejudice, which the court granted. Over fourteen years later, in 1995, Policarpio filed a new complaint for damages in the Quezon City RTC, alleging petitioner reneged on the 1980 agreement. Petitioner moved to dismiss on grounds of res judicata and prescription. The RTC denied the motion, and its denial was affirmed upon reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 45015). The CA dismissed this initial petition due to procedural defects, including failure to attach an affidavit of service and a proper written explanation for the mode of service. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration to cure these defects, petitioner filed a second certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 45251) assailing the same RTC orders.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the second petition for certiorari for being filed out of time.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. Procedural rules setting periods for filing appeals or petitions are generally inviolable and jurisdictional. An appeal is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, and compliance with reglementary periods is mandatory. The Court emphasized that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the previously flexible standard for determining the timeliness of a certiorari petition. Under the new Rule 65, Section 4, a petition must be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice,” a strict and inflexible period.
Applying this rule, petitioner’s second petition was filed late. Even under the old rules, which allowed a 90-day period, the petition was untimely. Petitioner received the RTC’s order denying reconsideration on May 21, 1997. Counting 90 days, the deadline was August 21, 1997. Under the 1997 Rules, effective July 1, 1997, the period was shortened to 60 days. Even if the 60-day period was counted liberally from July 1, the deadline was September 1, 1997. Petitioner filed its second petition only on September 12, 1997, making it late under either computation. The Court found no compelling reason to relax the rules, especially since petitioner abandoned its first petition instead of rectifying its procedural lapses. The petition was denied.
