G.R. No. 134113. October 12, 2005.
AIR FRANCE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE EMILIO L. LEACHON (Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 224) and LUMEN POLICARPIO, Respondents.

FACTS

In 1980, respondent Lumen Policarpio filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Air France Philippines. The parties entered into an amicable settlement via a “Release and Quitclaim” and jointly moved for the dismissal of the case, which the court granted with prejudice. Over fourteen years later, in 1995, Policarpio filed a new complaint for damages in the Quezon City RTC, alleging petitioner reneged on the 1980 agreement. Air France moved to dismiss on grounds of res judicata and prescription, but the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 45015). The CA dismissed this first petition due to procedural defects, including failure to attach an affidavit of service. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration to cure these defects, petitioner filed a second certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 45251) assailing the same RTC orders. The CA dismissed this second petition for being filed late, noting the inflexible 60-day period under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the second petition for certiorari for being filed out of time.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. Procedural rules setting periods for filing appeals or petitions are generally inviolable and jurisdictional. An appeal is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, and compliance with reglementary periods is mandatory to ensure orderly judicial administration.
The Supreme Court affirmed that whether evaluated under the old rules, which allowed a flexible period pegged at about 90 days, or under the stricter 1997 Rules, which prescribe a rigid 60-day period, the second petition was indisputably filed late. Petitioner received the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 21, 1997. Even under the old rules, the 90-day period would have lapsed by August 21, 1997. Under the 1997 Rules, the 60-day period, even if liberally counted from the rules’ effectivity on July 1, 1997, expired by September 1, 1997. Petitioner filed its second petition only on September 12, 1997. Moreover, petitioner’s tactic of abandoning its first defective petition instead of correcting its procedural lapses through a motion for reconsideration was an impermissible disregard of procedural rules. The Court emphasized that while rules exist to secure substantial justice, their mandatory nature cannot be relaxed where, as here, a party’s own negligence caused the delay.