GR 13392; (September, 1918) (Digest)
G.R. No. 13392 ; September 18, 1918
PAZ NATIVIDAD, Vda. de ZOLUETA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO MARQUEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On May 19, 1915, plaintiff Paz Natividad filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas to recover a sum of money based on a written document. The defendant, Bernardo Marquez, in his answer, alleged deceit but did not specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the instrument. The case was set for trial on January 22, 1917. Four days before the trial, the defendant filed a motion for postponement, attaching a medical certificate from Dr. Domingo Antonio stating that the defendant was suffering from amoebic dysentery and needed to stay in bed for at least two weeks. The trial court denied the motion, crediting instead the plaintiff’s sworn statement that she had visited the defendant the previous day and found him in a condition that did not suggest he was too ill to attend court. The court proceeded with the trial in the defendant’s absence, heard the plaintiff’s evidence, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial, supporting his motion with sworn statements from two physicians attesting to his illness during the trial period. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for postponement based on illness and in subsequently denying his motion for a new trial.
RULING:
No, the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the grant or denial of a continuance on the ground of a party’s illness rests almost entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion will not be interfered with unless it has been abused to the extent of prejudicing the applicant’s right to a fair trial. In this case, the initial medical certificate submitted with the motion for postponement was not sworn to. Furthermore, considering the state of the pleadingswhere the defendant had failed to deny under oath the genuineness of the written instrument sued uponthere was little left for the defendant to prove at the trial. Thus, the trial court’s refusal to postpone the trial and its denial of the motion for a new trial did not constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.