GR 132816; (February, 2002) (Digest)
G.R. No. 132816 ; February 5, 2002
SUSANA B. CABAHUG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN, 3rd Division, and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Susana B. Cabahug, as DECS Regional Director, entered into a negotiated contract for the purchase of armchairs. A competitor, Jesusa T. de la Cruz, complained to the DECS Secretary that the contract was overpriced. After internal review, DECS Undersecretary Antonio Nachura recommended giving due course to the transaction. Despite this, a complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, which found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Cabahug alone, leading to the filing of an Information with the Sandiganbayan.
Cabahug, unaware the Information was already filed, moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Special Prosecutor. This motion was denied. She then filed a “Motion for Re-determination of Existence of Probable Cause” with the Sandiganbayan, which the court denied, treating it as a second motion for reinvestigation and ruling the issues were evidentiary for trial. Her subsequent motions were also denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause and in proceeding with the criminal case despite an apparent absence of probable cause.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. The Court emphasized that while the determination of probable cause is generally an executive function, the judiciary retains the power to review and correct manifest errors, such as when a prosecution is clearly devoid of legal basis. In this case, the evidence presented did not establish probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019 .
The legal logic is clear: probable cause requires facts and circumstances sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty. The records showed the negotiated contract was recommended for approval by the DECS Undersecretary for Legal Affairs after review, and the price was found to be lower than the offer from the complaining competitor. The petitioner also consulted with COA officials. These facts negated any finding of gross inexcusable negligence or bad faith required under Section 3(e). The prosecution’s reliance on bare allegations, unsupported by substantial evidence, failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Consequently, proceeding with the trial without a reasonable ground to believe a crime was committed constituted grave abuse of discretion, warranting judicial intervention to prevent a useless and oppressive prosecution.