G.R. No. 132601 , January 19, 1999.
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

This case involves a Separate Opinion by Justice Vitug regarding the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) on January 4, 1999, staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray. The TRO was issued partly due to indications that Congress might re-examine the death penalty law ( Republic Act No. 7659 ). The Court’s resolution stated the TRO would be lifted before its expiry date if it became certain no repeal or modification of the law was forthcoming. The Office of the Solicitor General filed an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,” stating that circumstances had transpired making repeal or modification nil. The main issue in the Separate Opinion pertains to the Court’s authority to issue the TRO and the constitutional validity of the death penalty law.

ISSUE

The primary issue addressed in the Separate Opinion is whether the Court properly issued the TRO staying execution and, fundamentally, whether Republic Act No. 7659 , prescribing the death penalty, conforms to the strict constitutional requirements for its imposition.

RULING

Justice Vitug, in his Separate Opinion, expresses his consistent view that Republic Act No. 7659 falls short of the strict constitutional norm. He explains that the Court issued the TRO out of respect and comity to Congress, to allow it a limited time for potential re-examination of the law, not to reconsider the conviction or penalty. He affirms the Court’s authority to control a case until final judgment satisfaction and to suspend execution when imperative in the higher interest of justice or due to supervening events, citing jurisprudence such as Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite. He notes that the stay of execution does not preclude the President’s pardoning power or Congress’s legislative prerogatives. While he acknowledges the majority’s inclination to lift the TRO if further Congressional action appears futile, he votes against lifting it. He reiterates his constitutional interpretation that for the death penalty to be valid, Congress must establish compelling reasons based on a marked change in circumstances since the 1987 Constitution and must define with great clarity the heinous nature of the crime warranting the penalty. He respectfully disagrees with the majority’s holding on the law’s validity.