GR 132497; (November, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 132497 November 16, 1999
LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners obtained a money judgment against private respondents in 1980. After a revival of the judgment, several parcels of land owned by the respondents were levied upon and sold at a public auction to the petitioners on March 15, 1995, with the certificate of sale registered on July 25, 1995. The certificate stated the redemption period would expire one year from its registration. On July 16, 1996, respondents’ counsel sent letters to petitioners’ counsel and the sheriff, formally stating their intent to redeem and requesting a computation of the total redemption price. No reply was given. Believing the last day for redemption was July 25, 1996, respondent Pacifico Lejano tendered two cashier’s checks to petitioners’ counsel on that date, covering the purchase price and 12% interest. The counsel refused acceptance, claiming lack of authority. The respondents then filed a motion for consignation the next day, July 26, 1996.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents validly exercised their right of redemption within the statutory period.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the validity of the redemption. The legal logic centers on the proper computation of the redemption period and the sufficiency of the respondents’ actions to exercise their right. The one-year redemption period under the former Rule 39, Section 30, is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The certificate was registered on July 25, 1995. Since 1996 was a leap year, the period actually expired on July 19, 1996, not July 25. However, the Court ruled that the respondents’ written notice of intent to redeem, sent on July 16, 1996, was a valid exercise of the right, as it was made within the actual period. This written offer to redeem, accompanied by a request for an accounting, is deemed a valid tender of payment. The petitioners’ failure to provide the requested computation estopped them from claiming the tender was invalid due to an incorrect amount. The subsequent tender of cashier’s checks on July 25, though after the actual deadline, was a mere continuation of the timely July 16 exercise. The Court also found the petitioners’ new argument about their counsel’s lack of authority to be a prohibited issue raised for the first time on appeal. Consequently, the valid redemption precluded the issuance of a writ of possession to the petitioners.
