G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Joel M. Sanvicente was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong y Chua on June 11, 1995, outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. The incident allegedly occurred after the victim attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash he had just withdrawn from an ATM. The police recovered five empty .45 caliber shells, two live bullets, and an ATM card at the scene. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over petitioner’s licensed .45 caliber pistol to the police and submitted a letter stating his client’s account of the incident, characterizing it as an act of self-defense. The letter concluded by stating it served as a “voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt.” During trial, the prosecution presented a ballistics report linking the recovered slugs to petitioner’s firearm and offered the aforementioned letter as Exhibit LL. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground, among others, that double jeopardy had set in. The Court of Appeals, upon a petition for certiorari, nullified the trial court’s order of dismissal, finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the trial court’s order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the criminal case, thereby violating petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal, and any further prosecution would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case. In this instance, the prosecution was not denied the opportunity to present evidence; it completed its presentation and formally offered its exhibits, including Exhibit LL, which the trial court admitted. The prosecution’s claim that it was prevented from further establishing the genuineness of Exhibit LL “in the manner that it wanted” did not constitute a denial of the right to present evidence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Exhibit LL was an admission, not a confession, as it explicitly stated it was made “without admission of guilt.” The trial court, in evaluating the evidence on demurrer, correctly found the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion; therefore, its order of acquittal was final and invoked the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and set aside, and the trial court’s order dismissing the criminal case was reinstated.